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The asset-backed securities (ABS) market moved from the shadows
and into the spotlight during the recent financial crisis.  Regulators
around the world are now focusing on the reform 
of this market. What should Canada do?
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FINANCIAL SERVICESThe asset-backed securities (ABS) market suffered a major setback during the financial crisis
that began in 2007.  Its role in the broader market collapse has been well documented, but
the need to restore a healthy ABS market is equally clear. Indeed, North American
policymakers have readily acknowledged that this market must play a major role in the global
economic recovery and policymakers have recently moved beyond addressing the urgency of
restarting the ABS market to considering its reform. 
This Commentary provides historical context for these policy considerations, an analysis of
current reform proposals and some suggestions for their application to a policy approach that
reflects some unique Canadian market realities.  Enhanced transparency and better
accountability regimes are welcome steps but, pushed to the extreme, may constrain the
return of full liquidity to the ABS market. 
Based on current proposals, it is clear that reformers want to reduce the risk of systemic
liquidity failures in the senior ABS market that result from an excessive reliance on rating
agency assessments.  However, if this objective is to be realized without discouraging broad
investor participation in the senior ABS market, a more effective measure would be new
regulations that ensure that knowledgeable and objective market participants acquire and
retain a subordinate tranche of ABS backed by the same assets. We, therefore, recommend
that a subordinated class of ABS be placed with a third party as a condition of accessing public
markets for senior asset-backed medium-term notes.
This Commentary also raises unique Canadian considerations for ABS market reforms.
Specifically, it would be prudent in the Canadian context to impose new disclosure
requirements for all public market note issuance, not just for those wishing to access the
market through a shelf offering. 
Further, so-called monthly-pay pass-through notes, which “pass through” payments from
their underlying assets, need special attention.  Historically, the capacity of the market to
absorb these securities has been problematic.  However, since the fall of 2009, the Canadian
market has appeared to be more accepting of these securities. Should this support falter in the
future, a public-sector entity may be required to replace former funding sources (i.e.,
commercial paper conduits) that had supported the issue of bullet bonds (non-callable bonds
with a fixed maturity date and interest rate) to finance portfolios of monthly-pay consumer
and commercial credit products.
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stepped out of the shadows
and into the headlines in the
aftermath of the recent credit crisis. 
The role of the ABS market as a trigger and source
of contagion for market collapse has been
documented and acknowledged.  However, North
American policymakers have just as readily
acknowledged the role that the ABS market must
play in the global economic recovery.  Both in
Canada and the United States, public policy has
spurred the initial, halting recovery of the ABS
market.  Recently, North American policymakers
have moved beyond addressing the urgency of
restarting the market to considering its reform.  
For Canadian policymakers, the challenge is to
weigh the merits of proposed reforms with the
unique challenges presented by the domestic ABS
market. In Canada, more monitoring and
potential intervention may be required.  This
Commentary will attempt to provide a historical
context for these policy considerations, an analysis
of the reform proposals and some suggestions for a
unique Canadian policy approach. 
The Conceptual Underpinnings of Securitization 
The securitization market has been at the
forefront of the global economic growth story of
the past 20 years.  The unprecedented 15-year
surge in North American GDP growth between
1992 and 2007 corresponds almost perfectly with
the accelerating rise in the pool of outstanding
asset-backed securities in the US and Canada 
(see Figures 1 and 2).  While coincidence does not
prove causation, in this case the logical argument
for linkage is not a hard one to make.  By
reducing the borrowing costs for providers of
consumer and commercial financing, securitization
structures directly contributed to increasing levels
of leverage throughout the economy, and
particularly in North American households, 
given the dominant portion of the ABS market
dedicated to the financing of residential mortgage
portfolios (see Figure 3 and 4).
This same period was, of course, marked by a
prolonged period of exceptionally low base
interest rates maintained by central banks around
the world.  It was no wonder that the dominant,
and ultimately most troubling, aspect of the
extended period of exceptional GDP growth was
the corresponding increase in leverage levels in 
US and Canadian households.  Given the direct
role that the availability of asset-backed debt
played in facilitating that extension of credit, it is
hardly a stretch to assign a starring role to the
securitization market in the production of this
bull market for credit.  
The conceptual basis for the leveraging of credit
markets achieved through securitization structures
is not a complicated one; it is only the process of
executing the structures in the context of
applicable accounting, tax and commercial law
regimes that gives the market its opaque
complexity (that and its seemingly endless glossary
of acronyms that rivals only major league baseball
sabermetrics).  In its essence, securitization is
simply a means of allowing commercial entities
that originate pools of consumer and commercial
receivables to finance those receivables in the
capital markets directly in a manner that allows
lenders to be secured by those receivables without
any credit or recovery risk associated with the
originator itself.  It is distinct from secured
lending in that it provides not only the ability to
look through to the aggregated credit risk of the
diversified pool of obligors by whom the
receivable is owed (augmented, in most cases, by
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Figure 1 - Gross Domestic Product and Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding, Canada 
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications. 
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Sources: DBRS and Bank of Canada.
Figure 3 - Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding by Asset Classes, Canada, 2007 (Billions of Canadian
Dollars)
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Figure 4 - Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding by Asset Classes, United States, 2007 
(Billions of US Dollars)
Sources: The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Inside Mortgage Finance Publications.| 4 Commentary 315
additional cash collateral), but also ensures that the
likelihood and timing of default and cost of recovery
will not be impacted by credit events that occur in
the interim with respect to the originator.  With both
a lower probability of default and higher and less
procedurally complicated recovery given default,
originators can access a broader pool of lenders with
lower risk tolerance and thereby lower their overall
cost of capital, which in turn leads to lower costs of
credit to their customers.
Most of these structures result in debt issued in
the capital markets bearing ‘AAA’ credit ratings (or
the short-term equivalent in the context of asset-
backed commercial paper, referred to as ABCP).
At these ratings levels, the credit risk assessment
associated with these securities are on a par with
the sovereign risk of the most creditworthy
nations, including both the US and Canada, and
ahead of all but the most exceptional of corporate
borrowers.  However, just as the asset-backed
market was instrumental in the spectacular rise of
the global economy through 2007, its fingerprints
were all over the financial crisis that began in
2007 and continues to echo today.
Securitization and the Credit Crisis 
So what went wrong?  The tangled web of global
market interdependencies that spread the recent
crisis into every geographic and sectoral nook and
cranny of the financial market is indeed
complicated, but the role of the securitization
market as ground zero for the crisis is not hard to
describe.  Low interest rates drove global debt
investors to search far and wide for enhanced fixed
income yields.  Rated ABS were offered as low-risk
liquid investment opportunities with the benefit
of modest but meaningful complexity premiums
over the yields available on equivalent-duration
government bonds.  In short order, investor
demand outstripped the availability of traditional
consumer and commercial receivables, and those
complexity premiums contracted substantially.
This contraction in ABS spreads made its way
into the pricing of consumer and commercial
financing products, further stoking the red-hot
economy.  This effect was even more evident in
the United States, where public policies such as
the deductibility of interest paid on residential
mortgages made consumer debt even more
affordable.  
Throughout the boom, US policymakers,
mindful of the widening consumption and wealth
gaps between homeowners and non-homeowners,
introduced measures that encouraged the
extension of residential mortgage funding further
and further down the credit spectrum.  The boom
in the availability of credit for home buyers
spurred a rapid appreciation in the value of US
residential real estate, creating more collateral for
consumer spending subsidized through tax-
deductible interest payments on mortgage
advances. This increased spending further
exacerbated the consumption and wealth gaps
between homeowners and non-homeowners,
intensifying the policy rationale for encouraging
yet even broader residential mortgage eligibility.
The boom spread to the securitization market
through the US subprime mortgage market.
Subprime mortgages were mortgages extended to
individuals who would not otherwise qualify for a
prime mortgage offered by a bank.  Initially,
standard requirements such as minimum tenure of
employment or residence were waived.
Eventually, even verification of stated income was
waived, so as to not exclude the self-employed.  
At its peak, even the demonstrable capacity of
mortgagors to make the required monthly
payments of principal and interest at then
prevailing market rates ceased to be a requirement,
with mortgages negotiated on the basis of “teaser
rates” that reset after the first two years of what
could be a 25-year mortgage.  The rationale
behind this seemingly reckless product offering
was the expectation that the appreciation on the
underlying real property during that first two
years would generate sufficient equity either to
allow the mortgagor to refinance into a prime
mortgage or to monetize that equity appreciation
to assist in making the higher interest payments
once the rate had been reset.
These subprime mortgages were ultimately
organized into pools that were structured to be
financed in the ABS market.  The problem was
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that the assets backing these instruments lacked
the historical data that had allowed rating agencies
to reliably predict the performance of comparable
instruments backed by traditional prime
mortgages, credit cards or automobile loans and
leases through a full credit cycle.  Objective data
analysis, the hallmark of securitization structuring,
gave way to subjective theorizing. Those parties
structuring ABS offerings supplemented the
reassuring available short-term data on subprime
products with “fudge factors” that were based on
what were assumed to be wildly conservative
multiples of the actual default and loss experience
from traditional prime portfolios.  
This approach was obviously fraught with peril,
but the multiples assigned to the default and loss
data were large and probably would have sufficed
to offset the catastrophic defaults that were to
come but for another more insidious assumption.
The performance of ABS backed by prime
residential mortgages had long benefited from
geographic diversification.  Residential real estate
markets are inherently local, with movements in
valuations driven by the dominant economics of
specific areas.  Local plant closings or openings,
the popularity of tourist attractions waxing or
waning, natural resource discoveries or depletions
and demographic changes driving population
shifts can dramatically affect local real estate
values, but never before were such dramatic
movements national in their impact.  
Unfortunately, ABS structurers overlooked the
extent to which the creation of a new financial
product invalidated the predictive value of
available historical data.  The innovative offering
of subprime financing created a national tidal
wave of liquidity for US residential real estate.  All
boats rose with the tide, but the tide ebbed when
the pool of available mortgagors was exhausted.  
Having eliminated almost all income eligibility,
there nonetheless came a point when there was an
insufficient pool of potential home buyers that
could make even the minimal teaser-rate mortgage
payments. Without new buyers to drive house
prices still higher, the prospects for the most
recent buyers at the end of their teaser-rate period
were grim.  Without any appreciation of the value
of their properties, refinancing was impossible and
default and foreclosure all but a certainty.  
With those first foreclosures, stalled property
values went into freefall.  Soon, overleveraged
prime mortgagors faced financial calamity as
reduced loan-to-value ratios left them unable 
to refinance at rates available to other prime
mortgage borrowers.  Years of accumulated
household net worth evaporated in a matter 
of months.
The Credit Crisis  and Canadian ABS Market 
The fact that Canada has to date weathered the
financial crisis better than most other developed
nations has generally been attributed to more
conservative bank regulation, and there is certainly
some basis for this conclusion, particularly in
relation to our European counterparts.  However,
the significant performance gap between our
largest banks and their American counterparts is
materially attributable to the absence in Canada of
the catastrophic elimination of US household net
worth in the wake of the residential real estate
market collapse.  
While it is true that subprime mortgage lending
had made some inroads into the Canadian
market, it was a far different product than that
seen south of the border.  While non-bank lenders
had introduced some higher loan-to-value
mortgage products for borrowers with appropriate
credit scores and some lower loan-to-value
mortgage products for poorer credit risks (and the
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(CMHC) had responded with some softening of
the eligibility requirements for funding through its
government-guaranteed Canada Mortgage Bond
program), the US-style low/no income eligibility
and high loan-to-value rate reset products never
made it into the Canadian market.  Without
interest deductibility, the threshold of affordability
was set that little bit higher to dissuade demand
for such products, and a more conservative credit
culture precluded their offering.
While Canada’s conservative credit culture may
have spared us the worst of the damage, it did
little to spare our securitization market.  The
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Figure 5 - Asset-Backed Medium Term Notes Issuance, Canada and United States
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Figure 6 - Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding, Canada and United StatesCommentary 315 | 7
market panic surrounding exposure to US
subprime residential mortgages first crossed into
Canada through the C$32 billion portion of the
Canadian ABCP market that held exposures to
such assets, either directly or through exposures to
securities backed by other securities that
themselves included exposure to US subprime
residential mortgage portfolios.
2 As for all
Canadian conduits, the specific nature of the asset
holdings were unavailable to investors, who
purchased these securities in the exempt market,
relying on ratings that were provided almost
exclusively by DBRS, Canada’s only domestic
rating agency.  
As confidence in ratings dissipated around the
world, liquidity for structured products contracted
catastrophically throughout the summer of 2007,
finally landing in Canada on August 13, 2007,
when the market for non-bank ABCP evaporated.
However, by that time banks around the world
were beginning a slow and tortuous revelation of
their own exposures to the massive ABCP market.
Indeed, any market without full transparency was
suspect and rapidly losing liquidity.  
In short order, even the portion of the
Canadian ABCP market sponsored by domestic
banks was faced with liquidity challenges despite
the absence of any evidence of exposure to the US
subprime residential mortgage market.  Only the
timely conversion of the liquidity backstops
supporting these ABCP programs from the
unique Canadian “market disruption-only”
standard to the broader form of liquidity required
by US rating agencies in every other global market
spared the Canadian bank-sponsored conduits
from the fate that befell their non-bank brethren.
3
The Policy Response to the Market Freeze
At the same time that the ABCP market was being
buffeted by transparency concerns, liquidity was
disappearing around the world even for
ABMTNs,  which were subject to prospectus
disclosure requirements in all markets, including
Canada.  Even in the case of ABMTNs
4 backed by
assets demonstrably remote both in terms of asset
class and geography from the US residential
mortgage market, the market was immediately “no
bid.”  The structural complexity that had been so
welcome as the basis for risk-adjusted yield
premiums was suddenly suspect in a world where
ratings had been proven to be horribly unreliable.
As can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, ABMTN
issuance immediately disappeared both in Canada
and the United States in the wake of the financial
crisis.  At the same time, outstanding ABCP
began a rapid and uninterrupted decline as
underlying asset pools amortized without
replenishment through new purchases. 
Notwithstanding the immediate and wholesale
rejection of these products by global capital
markets, the public policy reaction to this
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phenomenon was surprisingly measured.  Given
the public outrage toward the excesses in the US
subprime residential mortgage market, one would
have expected an immediate and visceral policy
response marked by a rejection of the “shadow
banking” system built around policies supporting
the re-intermediation of all credit activity by
regulated financial institutions.  
However, the credit crisis devastation was so
widespread that even that seemingly simple
solution presented considerable challenges.
Among the institutions worst hit by the crisis were
the largest US banks that, despite their vilified role
in the distribution of tainted securities, still
managed to retain very large exposures to the most
senior tranches of such assets.
5 With massive
mark-to-market and credit losses on these
exposures, their own capital bases had been
critically eroded.  Finding new capital to stabilize
these institutions was already proving to be a
daunting task; to ask these same institutions to
raise sufficient capital to re-intermediate the
trillions of dollars of lending activity formerly
accommodated through the discredited shadow
banking system was unrealistic.
The prospects for funding this gap through
conventional debt issuance were no brighter.  The
debt crisis had accelerated the market awareness of
“fallen angels,” the sudden collapse of large highly
rated corporations into insolvency.  Before the
crisis, most mortgage originators that relied
heavily upon the asset-backed market were low- to
mid-investment grade companies who found
incremental capital market capacity and a lower
cost of funds in the ABS market.  Further, three of
the asset originators that fuelled the most prolific
ABS issuance were the captive finance arms of the
Big Three North American auto makers, two of
whom have recently gone through insolvency
proceedings and none of whom retain investment
grade ratings. In this environment, the prospects
for massively expanded conventional corporate
debt issuance filling the financing gap left by the
discredited ABS market were very remote.
The ABMTN Market Restart: TALF and CSCF
Without practical alternatives for either
immediate re-intermediation or increased
corporate debt issuance, policymakers were left
with few alternatives other than to revive the ABS
market.  However blameworthy and flawed one
might reflexively conclude it to be, the ABS
market would have to be immediately restored
and, in the longer term, rehabilitated.  The
manifestations of this conclusion were seen
immediately in both the US and Canada.  In the
United States, the Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF) was announced in
November 2008 and launched in March 2009,
providing non-recourse government loans to
finance as much as 95 percent of the purchase
price of senior ABMTNs backed by a wide range
of conventional assets, including auto and
equipment leases and loans, credit card
receivables, student loans, small business loans
and, ultimately, commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS).  
In Canada, the January 2009 federal budget
announced the creation of the Canadian
Structured Credit Facility (CSCF) that was
intended to provide liquidity for ABMTNs
backed by Canadian vehicle and equipment leases
and loans.  The ultimate design and
administration of the program was left to the
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC),
and the program was launched in June 2009 but
did not advance any funds for the purchase by
BDC of eligible senior ABMTNs until three
months later in September 2009.  Both TALF and
CSCF closed at the end of March 2010, with the
exception of CMBS eligible for the TALF
program, for which the window remained open to
the end of June 2010.
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In the case of both TALF and CSCF, the initial
volume expectations for the programs far exceeded
their actual activity levels.  When TALF was
announced, it was expected to support as much as
US$1 trillion of issuance in the moribund US
ABMTN market, but TALF-eligible issuance was
actually closer to US$100 billion.  Similarly, the
CSCF was announced with a maximum capacity
of C$12 billion, with actual utilization falling
slightly below C$4 billion.  
Nonetheless, these low utilization levels are not
indicators of lack of success from a public policy
standpoint. Both TALF and CSCF provided a
benefit to their respective markets that went
beyond their impact upon those availing
themselves of the programs.  What was critical was
the impact of each on market spreads.  
In late 2008, in both the United States and
Canada, the debt crisis had initiated an inexorable
upward spiral in the credit spreads attached to all
structured products.  Uncontrolled mark-to-
market losses had spurred panic selling and
precluded any primary issuance of ABMTNs.
Even originators of asset classes that had survived
the credit collapse without any downgrade or
extraordinary loss found themselves without
liquidity in the ABMTN market at any spread.
ABMTN investors who until 2007 would have
been happy to buy AAA-rated retail auto loan-
backed ABMTNs at a spread over equivalent
duration government bonds of 50 basis points
shuddered to buy at 400 basis points for fear that
they would face an immediate mark-to-market
writedown as spreads continued to widen. 
Given time, this disorder of market 
psychology would have righted itself, but not
before continuing unavailability of consumer 
and commercial credit further stalled the 
North American economies.  A discrete policy
intervention was necessary to arrest this
continuing spread widening that had become
unhitched from any real credit apprehension.
TALF and CSCF provided the required nudge to
market dynamics, albeit in different fashions.  In
the case of TALF, the attraction of opportunistic
investors to the ABMTN market rapidly expanded
the universe of available buyers, replacing those
that had invested purely on rating and lacked the
credit expertise to take independent views of these
complex instruments.  
Armed with non-recourse leverage, hedge 
funds seeking yield found TALF-eligible senior
ABMTNs as a compelling investment opportunity.
As yields on TALF-eligible ABMTNs tightened,
traditional ABMTN investors were forced into
non-TALF issues, reversing the spread-widening
trend.  In a matter of months, prime retail-auto
ABMTN spreads that had stood at over 500 basis
points at the end of 2008 were inside 100 basis
points, still well wide of their mid-2007 lows but
at a level at which a meaningful volume of credit
could be made available to support a resumption
in auto sales.
In the case of CSCF, the method of market
correction was more one of leadership than direct
market stimulation.  In June 2009, the CSCF
offered funding for AAA-rated auto and
equipment loans and lease-backed ABMTNs 
at a spread of 350 basis points, and originators
claimed allocations exceeding the available C$12
billion.  Within days, a public ABMTN offering
backed by Ford Credit Canada-originated retail
car loans priced at a spread equivalent of roughly
375 basis points.  
Investors coveting the credit quality of the
portfolio finally saw a cap on retail auto ABMTN
spreads.  Ford Canada quickly sealed the deal,
locking in a spread just above the CSCF-offered
rate, presumably choosing to continue to develop
its conventional investor base and avoid the
necessity of modifying its global ABS platform to
meet the eligibility requirements for CSCF
funding. Before any other originator could use the
CSCF-offered pricing, market spreads had
tightened further, placing the CSCF funding
option out of the money.  In September 2009,
BDC announced a further tightening in the
offered spread to 150 basis points. However, the
offer was not a free option; originators wishing to
seize the opportunity would have to claim an
allocation and pay a standby fee on the unused
commitment.  Take-up and utilization was less





































Figure 7 - Asset-Backed Medium Term Notes Issuance by Asset Classes, 
Public Issuance Only, Canada 
Source: Scotia Capital.  
Disclaimer : This graph reflects publicly available information compiled by Scotia Capital from a variety of sources and has not been independently verified.
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Sources: The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.
Figure 8 - Asset-Backed Medium Term Notes Issuance by Asset Classes, United States Commentary 315 | 11
than C$4 billion, but the impact on spreads was
significant.  Within days, Ford Credit Canada
priced a non-CSCF offering that was just beyond
the new offered spread and 100 basis points inside
secondary market spreads quoted just before the
CSCF re-pricing.
In both the United States and Canada, these
policy interventions helped restart ABMTN
market issuance.  In the United States, the TALF
program was more aggressive in its stimulation of
demand and broader in the asset classes to which
it applied.  As a result, the resumption of issuance
activity was correspondingly broader, both in
terms of asset classes and number of originators
(see Figure 7 and 8).  
In Canada, the CSCF program was a targeted
program from the outset, reflecting an industrial
policy overlay that was clearly focused upon the
Canadian impact of the serious challenges to the
North American auto manufacturing sector.  Not
surprisingly, the impact of the CSCF has been
more muted.  The rebound in public issuance
outside of the CSCF has been led by multiple
retail loan and floor plan receivable-backed deals
from Ford Credit Canada, a single retail loan-
backed transaction from GMAC, and credit card-
backed ABMTNs from three of the major banks.
Today, new issue spreads are markedly reduced
and stable, but by no means can it be said that the
breadth or volume of ABMTN issuance is at
anything approaching pre-crisis levels.  
In the United States, much of the reduction in
ABS activity can be attributed to the new US
consumer reality. The catastrophic collapse in
residential real estate values gutted household net
worth levels, and leverage capacity has been
correspondingly reduced.  In Canada, consumer
confidence remains stronger, leaving a greater
opportunity for a return to favourable lending
terms through the re-engagement of the ABMTN
market to generate a resurgence in demand for
consumer products.
ABS Market Reform
Having met with some success in restarting the
ABMTN market, North American regulators have
turned their attention to market reform. The goal
now is to restore confidence in the ABMTN
market’s potential as both a consistent source of
liquidity for asset originators and a safe avenue for
fixed income investment.  
The reform proposals tabled to date extend to
the entire ABS market, notwithstanding
compelling evidence that the incidence of credit
failure among ABS products was limited to US
subprime residential-backed mortgage securities.
Some would argue that the reform proposals are
too broad and could unduly hamper the size and
viability of the global ABS market.  While there is
certainly some merit to that criticism, it seems
clear that securities regulators around the world
are not inclined to accept a status quo in which
the global economy is vulnerable to global
illiquidity following a general loss of confidence in
ratings assessments emanating from any seemingly
isolated asset class.  
To address this concern, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions
published new disclosure principles for ABMTNs
on April 8, 2010.  This effort followed one day
after the release of a broader, more detailed and
onerous set of reform requirements proposed by
the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).  Parallel detailed embodiments of these
reform initiatives are also found in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, signed into law by President
Obama on July 21, 2010.  In response to these
international initiatives, the Canadian Securities
Administrators served notice on June 21, 2010
that it intended to provide draft proposals for
ABMTN market reform later in the summer.
Since these proposals have yet to be published, we
will instead focus on the themes of the SEC’s
proposed reforms. 
The SEC suggests a two-pronged approach,
restricting access to the ABMTN shelf-offering
system to issuers that conform to a regime that
contemplates both enhanced transparency for
investors and greater accountability for asset
originators and sponsors. However, what is at least
as interesting as what is included in the proposed
reforms is what is not. The proposals imposing
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materially enhanced requirements for transparency
clearly reflect the view that US ABMTN investors
had been so dependent upon rating agency
assessments that they dispensed with their own
analysis. On the other hand, those portions of the
proposals that require additional accountability
requirements on the part of originators and
sponsors address the notion that those parties hid
behind the rating agency assessments in creating
and promoting products that they knew or ought
to have known were deficient.  What is missing is
any attempt at reform of the role of the agencies
themselves.  
It is hard to find fault with this approach.  There
are obvious and troubling conflict issues in a
ratings model in which the issuers compensate the
agencies that provide the ratings.  However, as
thorny as these conflicts are, they are neither the
only nor the most fundamental barrier to imposing
greater accountability upon rating agencies.
These agencies do not seek nor are they
sufficiently capitalized to perform a fundamental
gatekeeper role in the issuance of securities.  Their
ratings are intended to be opinions, shortcuts for
the validation of independent views, not a
substitute for them.  Indeed, a business model
that actively encourages the level of investor
reliance that the most recent crisis has revealed
would demand a far higher level of capitalization
to backstop potential liability claims than is
currently maintained by the rating agencies.The
SEC proposals were right to look beyond the
rating agencies in reform of the ABMTN market.
(i)Transparency: The dominant theme of the SEC
proposals is improved disclosure. Unlike the
ABCP market, public ABMTNs in both Canada
and the United States have always been included
among the classes of securities that are subject to
regulation.  However, few if any specific rules exist
that reflect the specific challenges imposed by
securities like ABS whose creditworthiness are a
function of asset quality rather than the issuer’s
independent ability to pay.  It is this gap that the
SEC disclosure proposals seek to address.  
The proposals presume that uniform and
detailed disclosure of all relevant data regarding a
proposed ABMTN issue will allow investors to
satisfy themselves with respect to the merits of such
an investment. Clearly, such greater transparency
would be a step forward.  Investors troubled by the
inability to rely on rating agencies will be provided
with the relevant raw data so they can do the
analysis themselves.  Those without the experience
or resources to confidently perform that type of
analysis should not be buying such products.  It is
perfectly logical securities regulation.
But is it good economic policy?  Economic
growth relies upon vast amounts of leverage to
allow financial players to put capital at risk to
generate appropriate risk-adjusted returns in the
offering of goods and services. The size of the
senior debt component supporting global
economic activity necessitates the participation of
an enormous number of parties with widely
varying levels of financial expertise. 
While the expectations of expertise and
sophistication on the part of senior ABS investors
that is implicit in the SEC proposals may be
reasonable in the context of the largest investors,
such expectations may effectively preclude the
participation of a broader class of senior debt
investors, which would be extremely limiting to
the efficient use of economic capital. Furthermore,
even a chastened origination market will bring
forward concepts, products and structures of a
diversity and complexity that the most expert
senior debt investor cannot master.
It is possible that the SEC does not wish to
narrow the ABMTN market to such an extent.  It
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may instead expect that the availability of
information that allows independent analysis will
serve as a caution to unscrupulous sponsors and a
check upon the competitive instincts of rating
agencies.  In this model, smaller or less
sophisticated investors can “free ride” on the
discipline provided by those that in fact use the
enhanced transparency to perform the
independent analysis.  
But such an approach presents two risks that
are problematic from a public policy standpoint.
First, it imparts undue market authority to the
largest investors, who have the ability to direct a
great swath of liquidity as the less sophisticated
and smaller investors free ride on their presumed
diligence.  Alternatively, it leaves open the risk
that all investors become free riders, with each
presuming someone else has done the required
analysis, just as they had once relied upon rating
agency oversight.  
(ii) Accountability: It is reasonable to assume that
SEC had some misgivings about these limitations
of the transparency model given the inclusion of
some new accountability provisions in the
proposals.  After all, from the perspective of a
securities regulator, there is little that need be
done beyond what is provided for under the
proposed disclosure regime.  If investors lack the
sophistication or otherwise fail to use the
information they are given, what more can be
asked of a regulator, particularly where the very
form in which the information is required to be
provided points to the analysis that a qualified
investor would be expected to perform?  The
inclusion of further accountability requirements
can only be presumed to point to concerns over
the potential of so limiting the market, or to the
risks to the market that could be created by the
presence of too many free riders.
(a) Certification: The accountability regime takes
two forms: originator certifications and “skin in
the game” requirements.  The most striking
proposed certification requirement is for the
CEOs of originators. They would have to certify
that the assets and structure backing ABMTNs are
sufficient to generate the scheduled payments to
investors.  Implicit in this requirement is the
notion that the CEOs of companies that
originated subprime residential mortgages knew
or ought to have known that the securities backed
by their originated assets could not have possibly
paid out in accordance with their terms.  
However, even given the litany of failings
identified in the wake of the collapse of that
market, this is an allegation that would be difficult
to prove.  It is unreasonable to assume that CEOs
of companies engaged in mortgage origination
would have the requisite expertise to credibly
ratify the conclusions of rating agencies.  As a
basis for investor confidence, such an assumption
is even more flawed than the rating agency
reliance it purports to supplement if not replace.  
Perhaps the proposal’s real value is as the basis
for recourse in the event of any defaults,
effectively withdrawing the non-recourse feature
of asset-backed funding that forms the basis for
the incremental credit capacity purportedly
created by ABS structures.  If so, the SEC’s
proposed CEO certification may have the
undesired effect of precluding the incremental
debt capacity that forms the most essential policy
rationale for the re-launch of the ABMTN
market.
The SEC proposals also would require
independent auditor certification in cases where a
trustee has asserted a breach of covenant or asset-
eligibility representation and warranty that would
trigger an originator repurchase obligation.  The
intent of this provision is to sharpen the originator
accountability for asset eligibility that already
exists pursuant to the representations and
warranties to which the new requirement pertains.
Fundamental to the performance of ABMTNs is
the expectation that the assets underlying the issue
are in every way representative of those tested in
the modeling conducted by the rating agencies
and described in the relevant offering document.
Issuers and originators are required to represent
that this is so, further requiring that if it is found
to be not so with respect to any asset backing the
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ABMTNs, the originator will be required to buy
back the asset at the value at which it was
purchased by the issuer, regardless of its market
value at the time of repurchase.  
The new rule proposed by the SEC would
create a requirement for early third–party
verification to resolve disputes between trustees
and originators with respect to the breach of such
representations and warranties.  This proposed
measure reflects the realization that verifying such
breaches only after a default is often of marginal
benefit.  Given the correlation between the
solvency of originators and the credit standing of
the assets that they have originated, it will often be
the case that recovery for a breach is impossible
once a default has occurred. Therefore, enforcing
the repurchase obligation at the earliest suspicion
is desirable.
Nonetheless, the proposed provision only adds a
procedural expediency to a legal right that already
exists.  Where a trustee suspects the breach of an
eligibility representation, it has both the right and
obligation to pursue the remedy of specific
performance of the repurchase obligation.  The
effect of the proposed SEC rule is only to mandate
compulsory arbitration of such disputes through
an independent audit.  
While this procedural efficiency is not without
value, the far greater impediment to assertion of
such rights is the ability of trustees to identify
such breaches.  One would assume that upon the
establishment of this mandated right to audit,
trustees would be effectively obliged to require
eligibility audits with respect to any assets that are
reported as defaulted (or perhaps even only
delinquent) to ensure the best available protection
for investors. Such a practice would be a costly
one, as in the context of most asset classes, at least
some assets are noted as delinquent or defaulted
every month.  Given this reality, it would make
more sense to address the risks relating to asset
eligibility by requiring third-party audits as a
condition of closing a purchase rather than as an
ongoing right.  
(b)”Skin in the Game”: Notwithstanding some
marginal benefits, the new certification
requirements are little more than window
dressing.  Instead, the heart of the self-regulating
elements in the SEC proposals lies in the
requirement for “skin in the game.”  For more
than two decades, the market has presumed that
ABMTN investors were protected by the vigilance
of rating agencies.  The SEC proposals themselves
are an indictment of that presumption. Investors,
in the estimation of the SEC, delegated an
unhealthy level of the credit assessment function
to these utilities.  The new transparency
requirements reflect the expectation of a greater
degree of self-reliance on the part of even senior
investors.
6
ABMTN structures and the resulting securities
are complex; effective gatekeepers need to be more
than qualified and well-intentioned. They must
have the visceral and adrenal acuity that is found
only when one faces material economic risk based
on their own assessment.  
In retrospect, more shocking than the 2007
ABS market collapse is how well that market
functioned over the preceding 20 years.  While the
market may have relied upon public ratings for
the imprimatur of liquidity, the true gatekeepers
of creditworthiness were not the rating agencies.
For every asset class, there existed a specialized
group of investors that brought an “at-risk”
discipline to the asset composition, structure and
monitoring of ABS issues.  
The gatekeepers for ABMTN issues were
investors in investment-grade mezzanine tranches
backed by the same portfolios supporting senior
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tranches of AAA ABS.
7 These “mezz” investors
had specific expertise and experience with both the
underlying assets and the structures created to
securitize the risks. They made their purchases on
the basis of a thorough credit review equivalent to
that conducted by rating agencies, but with the
added rigour of true exposure to risk of loss.  As
these mezz investors became more successful and the
risk-adjusted returns became known to the market,
the search for yield brought third party investors to
funds under the management of these experts.
While this development seemed a great
opportunity for both the managers and a yield-
hungry investor market, the devil was in the
details. One needed to look no further than the
compensation structure.  Managers invariably
received fees based on both assets under
management and performance. They were thus
incented to do two things: maximize the size of
the fund and defer recognition of losses that
would undermine reported performance.  In time,
the dilution of the mezzanine debt holders’
gatekeeping function became even more insidious,
as mezz pieces were restructured into tranched
funds that in turn relied upon the liquidity of
AAA tranches to feed growth.  In effect, the real
gatekeepers came to hand off large portions of
their role to the nominal gatekeepers, the rating
agencies.  There was, in the parlance of the
Wizard of Oz, no man behind the curtain.
The SEC proposals seek to restore vitality to the
gatekeeping function. Sponsors seeking to avail
themselves of the benefits of shelf offering would
be required to retain a minimum of a 5 percent
slice of the securities offered in any ABMTN
issue.  Note that the requirement is not to hold a
five percent exposure junior to the offered
securities, but rather that the sponsor hold that
percentage of each class of securities that are the
subject of the shelf offering.  
Under a typical ABS structure, the originator
holds a non-offered first-loss position equal to
roughly 10 percent of the book value of the
underlying assets.  A second loss position is created
and offered in the form of a high-investment-grade
rated mezzanine tranche of roughly 5 percent,
which is the amount required to qualify the
remaining senior tranche as an AAA security. In
the context of this typical example, the SEC
requirements would leave the sponsor holding a
mezzanine tranche representing only 0.25 percent
of the total book value of the underlying assets, a
portion of junior risk that would likely be smaller
in dollar value than the total fees available to the
sponsor for distribution or other functional roles
that it might play in the transaction.
The requirement of a vertical slice rather than a
subordinate position is clearly intended to address
an alignment-of-interest risk that can arise in
structured credit offerings.  If the sponsor’s
position is entirely subordinate to that of the
senior creditors and that sponsor plays an ongoing
monitoring or reporting role, there exists the
potential for the sponsor to be influenced by
considerations contrary to those of the senior
investors. This is particularly true when there is a
risk of significant losses on the underlying
portfolio. When events develop that could result
in losses to the junior tranche but not the senior
tranche, the holder of the junior tranche might be
motivated to see the portfolio serviced in a fashion
that allowed delinquent obligors more time and
opportunity to work their way out of delinquency,
even if that meant putting at risk the recovery
available from collateral seizure and sale. The
holder of the junior tranche has nothing to fear
from intensifying the size of the potential loss
from default because even a small loss would wipe
out its position.  Senior lenders, on the other
hand, are motivated to reduce, not eliminate,
losses, since their positions are protected by the
first-loss exposure held by the originators and the
second-loss position held by the holders of the
mezzanine ABMTNs.  
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This sort of conflict became a source of
contention with some collateral debt obligations
(CDO) leading up to and during the market
meltdown in cases where CDO managers had asset
management discretion on behalf of senior investors
with respect to portfolios in which they also held a
subordinate interest, either directly as the holder of a
junior securities issued as part of a mezzanine
tranche or indirectly through the right to
performance fees related to the levels of reported
defaults and losses in the underlying portfolio. The
requirement for sponsors to hold a vertical slice
prevents this misalignment of interests, but at the
expense of meaningful loss exposure on the part of
the sponsor.  There is instead a more direct way to
address this potential conflict between senior
investors and those providing monitoring and
discretionary management. First, anyone who
retains management responsibility on behalf of an
investor class should be prohibited from holding any
subordinate interest in the portfolio. Secondly, the
calculation and payment of any performance fees to
discretionary service providers based on defaults and
losses should be required to be deferred until after
the maturity of the relevant senior notes.  Once
freed of the risks associated with this misalignment
of interest, the question of the quantity and form of
skin in the game can be addressed on the merits of
the focus that it can bring to the application of
judgment in the selection, monitoring and
management of the portfolio.
That leaves two questions; how much
subordinate risk retention is necessary to augment
the new transparency to ensure that a broad class
of senior investors can return to the ABMTN
market without undue reliance on rating agency
risk assessments and who should hold that risk?
Addressing the second question first, the most
obvious candidate is the originator.  In most asset
classes other than CMBS, originators already bear
the expected loss risk with respect to their
portfolios through the retention of a first-loss
exposure.  This makes obvious sense; no one
should be buying any ABMTNs backed by assets
for which the originator is not the party best able
to estimate and manage the expected loss.
However, originators will too often underestimate
the probability and impact of unexpected systemic
loss in their business.  Truth is, individuals that are
cautious analysts of systemic risk are poorly suited
to the leaps of faith required of business operators.  
The essential gatekeeper is the mezzanine
investor who has the requisite level of specific asset
class and structural expertise to determine a level
of first-loss protection that can deliver an
investment grade ABMTN. Buyers of instruments
bearing such mezzanine risk do not rely upon
rating agency assessments in this credit
determination.  As mentioned above, the primary
objective in obtaining ratings for such instruments
is to support secondary market liquidity. However,
it is the rating agency that determines the size of
the mezzanine piece that is required to support
the issue of senior AAA ABMTNs.  The
mezzanine investor will seek to maximize the
leverage on its returns by minimizing the size of
the tranche.  Still, under the present regime, it is
only the discipline of the rating agency that
pushes back to ensure that senior investors are
properly protected.
Policymakers can shift the intricacies of the
tranche thickness negotiation away from a mezz
investor-rating agency dynamic to one involving
the mezz investor and the first-loss provider (who
is likely the originator). They can achieve this goal
by requiring the placement of a mezzanine tranche
of a specified minimum size (referred to as
“tranche thickness”) with an arms-length third
party as a condition for senior ABMTNs
accessing public markets.
8 The logic is
straightforward. If the regulated minimum
mezzanine tranche thickness is conservatively set
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at a level larger than that which would be required
to enhance the creditworthiness of a bare
investment-grade portfolio (say BBB rated), then
the risk is only that the AAA tranche would be
over-enhanced.
9 If, for example, the minimum
mezz tranche thickness was 5 percent and the
rating agency determined that only 3.5 percent
above the first-loss protection level was required to
support a AAA rating, senior ABS investors would
be overprotected.  However, since such over-
enhancement would negatively impact the
efficiency of ABS funding for asset originators, it
would be incumbent upon the mezz provider and
the issuer to offer the mezz tranche at a spread
that reflected the 30 percent of the mezz tranche
that was, in the rating agency’s view, AAA risk.  It
would be the mezz holder, equipped with the
expertise and experience to confirm and price this
risk, and not the senior ABMTN holder, who
would be left to assess the reliability of the rating
agency view as reflected in the offered spread on
the mezz tranche.
Unique Canadian Considerations for
ABS Market Reform
With new requirements for the placement of
minimum sized mezzanine tranches with third
party investors, a new basis for broad participation
in the senior ABMTN market would be
established.  In the context of the SEC proposals,
the proposed regulatory reforms are anticipated to
be introduced as conditions for accessing shelf
issuance.  While the timing advantages of accessing
the shelf offering system are considerable, it may be
unwise to ignore the possibility of issuers seeking to
obviate the reforms simply by sticking with the
more arduous requirements of long form issuance.
This is particularly relevant in the context of the
Canadian market, where the lower frequency of
issuance and the more arduous distribution process
already offset some of the timing advantages
otherwise available through shelf offering.  In the
Canadian context at least, it would seem prudent to
impose new requirements for ABMTN issuance as
conditions of accessing the public market
altogether, not just shelf offering.
There are other unique aspects of the Canadian
market that must be considered.  Market
disruption liquidity supporting the ABCP market
was not the only unique feature of Canadian ABS
funding.  The Canadian debt market has long
struggled with its capacity to support the funding
of monthly-pay amortizing assets.  In the earliest
days of the Canadian ABS market, during the
early 1990s, vehicle and equipment leases and
loans were the asset class most often brought to
the ABMTN market.  These monthly-pay
amortizing assets generated a monthly cash flow
that blended payments of principal and interest.  
In the case of loans, the asset amortized to zero
over the term of the securitized loan agreement.
In the case of leases, the asset amortized to a
specified residual value and either required a
balloon payment from the lessee at maturity (in
the case of an open-end lease) or sale by the lessor
and application of the proceeds to the remaining
financed cost of the underlying asset (in the case
of a closed-end lease).  
Further along that spectrum was the residential
mortgage market, where the assets also provide a
monthly stream of blended payments of principal
and interest, but with an even greater balloon
payment required at maturity.  Even further along
that spectrum are commercial mortgages, where
the monthly payments are usually blended
payments of interest and principal (but can
sometimes be interest only) but with even larger
balloon payments required at maturity. 
In the US ABMTN market, these monthly-pay
amortizing assets were generally funded with the
issue of pass-through securities.  Pass-through
ABMTNs have no specified monthly payments
but instead simply pass through to each investor a
pro rata share of the principal and interest paid by
the various underlying borrowers, lessees or
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mortgagees.  The ABMTN investors thereby
assume the slow-pay risk associated with
delinquencies and the fast-pay risk associated with
prepayments, providing perfect asset-liability
matching for the originators.  
From the Canadian ABMTN market’s
beginnings in the early 1990s, this sort of match
funding proved to be a challenge.  The appetite
for true pass-throughs was limited, and the spread
concession required for placement was
considerable.  The earliest originators, who were
generally the Canadian subsidiaries of investment-
grade US originators with experience as ABMTN
issuers in the United States, were unimpressed
with this limitation of the Canadian market. The
disinclination of Canadian fixed income investors
to pass-through securities was generally attributed
to a combination of laziness and a lack of
sophistication on the part of Canadian fixed-
income investors.  
There was some basis for that impression. 
Most of the early ABMTN investors came to the
product reluctantly only when regular government
bond issuance slowed dramatically with the deficit
reductions of the 1990s.  The cash management
regimes and reinvestment schedules for most
Canadian fixed income investors were entirely
built around government and high-grade
corporate issuance of securities that paid interest
semi-annually and repaid principal as a bullet 
at maturity.  
However, the habitual passivity of Canadian
fixed-income investors was not entirely to blame
for the relatively small Canadian market. The
reality was that for all but the largest investors, the
small monthly distributions from monthly-pay
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Figure 9 - National Housing Act Mortgage-Backed Securities and Canada Mortgage Bonds Outstanding
Guaranteed by CMHC 
Note: Amounts outstanding reflect the amount of outstanding guarantees in force for CMHC securitization.  The NHA MBS figures are net of purchases under the
Insured Mortgage Purchase Program.
Source: CMHC Annual Reports.Commentary 315 | 19
pass-through ABMTN issues were too small to
efficiently reinvest in the month received.  Most
often, several months of periodic distributions
needed to be accumulated to be reinvested at
anything approaching the yield on the ABMTN
issue from which it was generated.  
Accordingly, investors in pass-through ABMTNs
had to absorb or otherwise offset a significant
amount of reinvestment inefficiency that made
even the complexity premiums from such issues
uncompetitive with more mundane semi-annual-
pay investment opportunities.  This was not the
case in the United States, where smaller investors
generally had portfolios that were, reflecting the
population and GDP differences between the two
countries, at least 10 times larger. These investors
could, accordingly, reinvest the proceeds of their
pass-through ABMTNs book without the same
risk of inefficient reinvestment.
The contrasting market depth for semi-annual
pay bullet ABMTNs over monthly-pay pass-
throughs became clear in 1999 when Canadian
Schedule 1 banks became frequent issuers of
bullets to fund their credit card portfolios.
10
Overnight, markets that strained to accommodate
$300 million in single monthly-pay pass-through
ABMTN issues backed by vehicle and equipment
leases and loans were suddenly capable of
absorbing $1 billion-plus of semi-annual pay
bullet bonds backed by credit card receivables 
(see Figure 7).  While it is true that some of the
enhanced appetite for these bullet bonds reflected
the market preference for Canadian Schedule 1
banks as originators and servicers of assets backing
ABS issues, there was no doubt that the funding
format contributed the bulk of the incremental
demand.
The reality that this experience forced on the
ABMTN market was most notably conceded in
the introduction by Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation (CMHC) of the semi-
annual bullet bond Canada Mortgage Bond
program in June 2001.  The program was an
immediate hit with both Canadian and offshore
investors, providing an effective cost of funds to
mortgage originators that eclipsed every other
available source of financing for insured
mortgages, including CMHC’s monthly-pay pass-
through funding structure, the National Housing
Act Mortgage-Backed Securities program. Figure 9
shows the dramatic impact of this new program
on issuance volumes for CMHC-sponsored
mortgage programs.  
With the Canada Mortgage Bond program, the
die was seemingly cast for the Canadian ABMTN
market.  The most prolific source of monthly-pay
amortizing assets, the pool of insured residential
mortgages, was cast into a semi-annual pay bullet
funding format.  Whatever potential there might
have been to generate the transaction flow
required to develop liquidity for pass-through
ABMTNs in other asset classes disappeared.
Bullet bonds became the only viable funding
format for Canadian ABMTNs.
Originators in other monthly-pay amortizing
asset classes quickly adapted to this reality.  New
structures were created to fund monthly-pay
vehicle and equipment leases and loans.  Bullet
ABMTNs were carved out of the monthly-pay
amortizing cash flows. Monthly payments and
prepayments were absorbed by an amortizing
tranche that was in turn funded through
Canadian commercial paper conduits that had the
capability to adjust their funding to reflect the
monthly principal payments.  
When the time came for retirement of the
issued bullets, funds would be raised by the
conduit holding the amortizing note (usually
called a variable funding note or a variable
payment note) to provide the required principal
repayment.  The only technical limitation was the
inability of the conduit to provide a forward
commitment to re-advance to retire the bullets.
However, this limitation proved to be of little
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consequence, as both issuers and investors
accepted the risk of the ABCP market illiquidity.
In an era of exponential ABCP growth (see Figure
6), neither rating agencies nor investors saw this
risk as sufficiently material to preclude issuing
AAA-bullet ABMTNs.
The assumptions supporting this successful
structure held true until the summer of 2007. In
August 2007, following the crash of the non-bank
ABCP market, bank-sponsored conduits were
challenged to roll over their outstanding balances;
they were in no position to issue additional ABCP
to fund maturing ABMTN bullets.  Several bullets
defaulted, and the structure that had permitted
non-mortgage monthly-pay asset originators to
access bullet ABMTN funding ceased to be viable.
No matter how quickly or robustly the ABCP
market recovered, the assumptions that had made
that funding structure viable would never be
accepted again.
When liquidity haltingly returned to the
Canadian vehicle and equipment retail lease and
loan-backed ABMTN market with the
encouragement of the CSCF program, it did so in
the form of monthly-pay pass-through securities.
So far, the market reception has been encouraging.
Table 1 shows the Canadian transactions that have
been completed since the market crash without
resort to CSCF funding through BDC that have
funded monthly-pay assets with pass-through
notes.  
However, the market limitations described
above with respect to the single issue and total
market capacity issues for monthly-pay pass-
through ABMTNs cannot be presumed to have
been solved in the wake of the market collapse. It
remains to be seen whether the Canadian fixed-
income market will prove to have sufficient
liquidity to meet the needs of the recovering
vehicle and equipment receivable origination
market. The total market capacity requirements
are even more acute given the shrinkage of the
Canadian bank-sponsored conduit market from
$80 billion in the summer of 2007 to just under
$30 billion today.  This contraction reflects a
dramatic reduction in origination rates for vehicle
and equipment leases and loans as consumers and
businesses sharply curtailed borrowing in the wake
of the recession.  
However, it would be imprudent to assume that
conduit capacity will rebound to pre-crisis levels
with a resumption of demand from consumer and
commercial borrowers.  The appetite of Canadian
Schedule 1 banks for large conduit holdings, now
that they are required to backstop these conduits
with more capital-intensive global-style liquidity,
will be more modest than it had been when such
programs were backed by “market disruption-
only” lines.  For the monthly-pay pass-through
ABMTN market to meet demand, it must
demonstrate sufficient liquidity to accommodate
not only the return of traditional ABMTN issuers
but also the issuance needs of monthly-pay asset
originators who have been squeezed out of the
conduit market.
As the economic recovery continues, demand
for consumer and commercial credit should be
hoped or expected to ramp up to pre-crisis levels,
challenging the capacity of the Canadian
ABMTN market.  The continuing re-emergence
of this market, backed by monthly-pay amortizing
assets, should be closely monitored.  If the market
capacity for monthly-pay pass-through notes is
not sufficient to meet that demand, intervention
to stretch that capacity may be needed.  In those
circumstances, one potential public policy
approach would be to consider de-emphasizing
the successful Canada Mortgage Bond program
with a view to encouraging more funding through
the monthly-pay pass-through National Housing
Act Mortgage-Backed Securities program.  In
redirecting the insured mortgage market, the largest
source of monthly pay amortizing assets, back
toward this funding format, it is possible that the
resulting incremental issuance volumes (and
corresponding monthly cash flows to investors)
could offset the issues with reinvestment efficiencies
that have historically discouraged the participation
by smaller Canadian investors in the pass-through
ABMTN market and thereby encourage a
significant increase in market capacity.
Market capacity for monthly pay pass-through
securities is already being tested.  Since October
2009, six offerings of conventional monthly-pay
pass-through National Housing Act Mortgage-
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Backed Securities have been issued by Canadian
Schedule 1 banks.  While these new offerings could
be interpreted as evidence of growing market
capacity, their pricing suggests otherwise.  The most
recent of those issues was executed at a spread above
the then-equivalent-duration Government of
Canada bond yield that would have replicated the
economics of purchasing a five-year bullet Canada
Mortgage Bond program bond even if the investor
generated no yield on the periodic principal
repayments received.  These are not economics that
are indicative of a growing receptivity to pass-
through securities, at least not in the context of
insured residential mortgage-backed issues.
On the basis of this historical and more recent
experience, it is reasonable to conclude that a
dramatic recalibration of CMHC’s funding
programs would likely be disruptive to the
Canadian residential mortgage market.
Accordingly, should intervention to restore liquidity
for Canadian monthly-pay amortizing assets be
deemed necessary, other policy prescriptions should
be considered.  If the lack of liquidity is believed to
be a function of the capacity limits of the market
for monthly-pay pass-through ABMTNs,
intervention to permit the funding of non-
mortgage monthly-pay amortizing assets with semi-
annual-pay bullet bonds should be undertaken. A
government-sponsored entity or Crown
corporation (BDC, perhaps) might be required to
provide funding commitments to hold the variable
funding notes that were formerly financed through
Canadian ABCP conduits.  
The structure of these bullet-bond funding
programs could follow the pre-crisis templates, with
one exception. The ability to draw down funds
under the variable funding notes from the
government funding entity would have to be on a
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Table 1 Overview of Recent Non-CSCF Asset-Backed Medium Term Notes Transactions 
Sources: DBRS, SEDAR and authors’ calculations.
Issuance Date Asset Class Originator Amount (Millions) Public /Private Type
April-09 Auto Receivables  Ford $600 Private Pass-through
June-09 Auto Receivables Ford USD$1,300  Private Pass-through
June-09 Auto Receivables Ford $597 Public Pass-through
Aug-09 Auto Receivables Ford $1,000 Private Pass-through
Sept-09 Auto Receivables Ford $950 Private Pass-through
Sept-09 Auto Receivables BMW $300 Private Pass-through
Jan-10 Auto Receivables Ford $518 Public Pass-through
Feb-10 Auto Receivables GMAC $694 Public Pass-through
April-10  Auto Receivables Ford $270 Private Pass-through
May-10 Floorplan loans Ford $355 Public Bullet
May-10 Credit Cards RBC $1,283 Public Bullet
May-10 Credit Cards CIBC $1,152 Public Bullet
July-10 Credit Cards National Bank $587 Public Bullet
July-10 Floorplan loans Ford $120 Private Bullet
August-10 Credit Cards CIBC $647 Public Bullet 
Sept-10 Auto Receivables Ford $669 Public Pass-through| 22 Commentary 315
committed basis to satisfy the needs of the private
holders of bullet-bond tranches.  While this would
represent a significant government funding
commitment for the ABS market, it would
otherwise maximize private ABMTN capacity and
still fall well short of the fully government-
guaranteed Canada Mortgage Bond model already
used in funding the Canadian residential mortgage
market.
Conclusion
The credit crisis from which we are now emerging
provided ample evidence of the pervasiveness of the
ABS market in financing consumer and
commercial credit around the world.  While
tempting to consider, stuffing the ABS genie back
into the bottle offers no short or long term benefit
to the global economy.  North American
policymakers have already recognized this reality
and quickly put in place programs to accelerate the
re-start of this critical market.  
However, the credit crisis exposed the risk of
systemic liquidity failures based on temporary
catastrophic losses of confidence in rating agencies.
In response, regulators are demanding that the ABS
market demonstrate resiliency based on credit
ratification derived from more than just ratings.  
To date, the emphasis in reform proposals has
been upon greater self-reliance by investors,
supported by sharply elevated expectations of
transparency.  These transparency requirements
carry with them expectations of a breadth of
capacity and expertise that only the largest and
most sophisticated senior investors can satisfy. If
senior ABS market capacity is to be maximized, a
regulatory approach mandating the participation of
alternative market gatekeepers in addition to, or in
place of, transparency may need to be considered. 
The introduction of policy initiatives that
require and encourage the participation of
mezzanine investors in ABMTN structures would
ensure that private market participants that face
material economic risks perform this crucial
gatekeeper function.  At the same time, close
monitoring of the adequacy of the market appetite
for monthly-pay pass-through ABMTNs should
be maintained.  Should market capacity appear to
be constraining origination activity, further
market intervention may be necessary to
encourage adequate liquidity for Canadian
originators of non-residential mortgage monthly-
pay amortizing assets, including particularly
vehicle and equipment loans and leases.
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